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“I have not been able to discover how devolution works in 
the area of science and technology policy”: Council for 




In previous papers, (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, various dates), 
we have been concerned with a number of aspects of the 
operation of the devolution settlement, particularly but not 
exclusively relating to financial issues. One of our 
concerns has been whether the interface between the 
handling of devolved matters by the Scottish Executive and 
the handling of complementary reserved matters by UK 
government departments works satisfactorily. Such an 
interface issue arises in the field of science: we 
concentrate here on a particular problematic example, the 
Scottish Agricultural and Biological Institutes (SABRIs). 
There are five SABRIs, as listed in the footnote below.1 
 
The SABRIs receive their core funding from the Scottish 
Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department 
(SEERAD), that is out of devolved funding, but they are 
nevertheless clearly regarded as being an integral 
constituent of the UK science base. We ask in this paper 
whether the arrangements for funding the SABRIs and 













Opinions expressed in 
economic perspectives are 
those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
1.          The Scottish Crop Research Institute (SCRI), which is 
concerned with plant science; the Hannah (HRI),  which focuses 
on the interactions between mother and offspring and related 
health issues, as well as technologies for the Scottish Food and 
Drink industry; the Moredun (MRI), which researches infectious 
diseases of livestock; the Rowett (RRI)  which performs research 
aiming to define how nutrition can prevent disease, improve human 
and animal health, and enhance the quality of food production in 
agriculture; the Macaulay (MLURI) which carries out biological 
and socio-economic  research to meet the needs of sustainable 
rural development and environmental management in Scotland 
and elsewhere; Biomathematics and Statistics  Scotland, BIOSS, 
is administered by SCRI and is concerned with the application of 
statistics  and mathematics in the biological  sciences. 




interests of the SABRIs themselves, and more generally, in 
the interests of the wider Scottish economy. 
 
We conclude that there are significant weaknesses. First, 
the funding arrangements are sub-optimal in that almost 
uniquely among the core science base the SABRIs are 
barred from accessing Research Council and major charity 
funding. Secondly, the existence of the SABRIs in their 
current form has arguably distorted priorities within the 
Scottish Executive’s overall support for science. Thirdly, and 
conversely, the SABRIs are not fully integrated into the 
planning and strategy arrangements  for the UK science 
base. 
 
While this paper is concerned primarily with the SABRIs, the 
issues identified have wider implications for the public 
funding of research in Scotland and for devolution. 
 
 
The SABRIs: Background 
Originally, the SABRIs were primarily focused on research 
and testing in agriculture and land use, reflecting the 
historical importance of agriculture to the Scottish 
economy. Their current number and structure derives from 
their history, with several institutes being established 
through private endowments, and some in their origins 
serving a very local market, for example, the North East. 
Through time the institutes’ primary funding was taken over 
by the then Scottish Office and subsequently by the 
Scottish Executive. 
 
In recent years the emphasis of the SABRIs has evolved 
from a strictly agricultural focus to embrace wider 
developments in biotechnology, immunology, genetics, etc. 
It is worth noting two points about this change in 
emphasis. First, it means that the SABRIs are actively 
engaged in research relevant to some of today’s most 
important cutting edge industries. Second, these subjects 
are ones in which Scotland’s universities are also actively 
involved. The SABRIs have a distinguished track record both 
nationally and internationally in the excellence of the 
research they have produced. 
 
The objective of SEERAD in supporting the SABRIs is: 
 
“To maintain in Scotland an agricultural and biological 
science base of high quality, relevant to Ministers’ 
wider policies and to support Ministers’ legislative, 
policy and enforcement roles by the provision of 
scientific and other services”. (Scottish Executive Draft 
Budget 2003-04) 
 
SEERAD expects the SABRIs to focus on the needs of end- 
users. SEERAD also regards the SABRIs as being “highly 
and increasingly relevant to policy”, and it is the SABRIs 
which conduct the majority of SEERAD’s research 
programme. 
Despite the apparent clarity of the above objective, there 
does appear to be considerable confusion as to whether the 
remit of the SABRIs is primarily focused on Scotland or is 
much broader. On the one hand, prior to April 2003, the 
SABRIs were Non-Departmental  Public Bodies and Scottish 
Public Bodies: in this context, “a Scottish Public Body has a 
remit which is concerned with devolved matters. It is not a 
body with a remit covering reserved matters or having a UK 
or GB wide remit.” (Ref: Scottish Office, 1997). 
 
This places the SABRIs firmly within the devolved context, 
(at least until April 2003), and if taken strictly at face value 
would imply that they should not have had a UK wide remit. 
 
On the other hand, in the 1999-2003 SEERAD strategy for 
SABRI research, the stated objective of the strategy was “to 
support and maintain, as part of the UK science base, a 
strategic research capability in key areas of agricultural, 
biological, and related environmental, physical and social 
sciences, building on existing strengths and taking 
account of new opportunities and changing end-user 
needs.” Indeed, the strategy also notes that the department 
“takes the UK lead for soil science, sheep research, dairy 
research, and potato, spring barley and soft fruit research.” 
This implies that the SABRIs do have a UK wide role as an 
integral part of the UK science base. It is clear from other 
statements made by SEERAD in their research strategy that 
the SABRIs are expected to play an international role. 
It is also relevant to refer here to statements made by the 
SABRIs themselves on how they regard their mission. For 
example, the Rowett notes in its Corporate Plan that it is 
one of four publicly-funded Nutrition Research Institutes in 
the UK of which the other three are all funded by Research 
Councils, and that its research complements rather than 
competes with other centres. 
 
At least as regards public statements, therefore, there is 
confusion about the SABRIs remit. As we shall see in the 
next section, this in turn is reflected in problems with the 
SABRIs funding mechanisms. 
 
 
Funding of the SABRIs 
For 2003-04, SEERAD provided core grant-in aid to the 
SABRIs of £35.6 million, with a further potential of flexible 
funding of up to £6.3 million. The Scottish Executive’s 
strategy for the SABRIs relies on the SABRIs securing 
external funding to supplement core grant-in-aid funding 
and SEERAD’s own Flexible Fund contracts. 
 
The Scottish Executive method of providing core funding to 
the SABRIs could be perfectly appropriate for a body whose 
primary focus was as an Executive Agency mainly serving 
the needs of its funding depar tment. However, as we have 
seen in the previous section, in reality the SABRIs are 
expected to fulfil a wider role, providing excellent research 
of international standing and forming an integral part of 
the UK science base. Unfortunately, their position as 
sponsored bodies of the Scottish Executive constitutes a 




real handicap for the SABRIs in securing appropriate 
funding to pursue this wider remit. 
 
The difficulty arises because of the operation of the Haldane 
doctrine: (see CST Quinquennial Review). Dating from 
1918, this doctrine set out the principle that research 
money derived from government sources should not be 
linked to government agendas. Under the Haldane doctrine, 
the research councils do not provide funds to support 
government policy-driven research. Thus, as far as the 
research councils are concerned, since the SABRIs receive 
their core funding from the Scottish Executive and some of 
their activities are policy related research, the SABRIs fall 
funded sister institutes. (These institutes are the Institute 
of Animal Health, the Institute of Grasslands and 
Environmental Research, the Rothamsted, the John Innes 
Centre, the Institute of Food Research, and Roslin: note 
that one of these institutes, Roslin, is in fact located in 
Scotland): also included in the table is DEFRA’s CSL. 
 
 
Institute Funding £ million 
 
SEERAD/DEFRA Dept as % of 
Institute /FSA Total Total 
within the restrictions imposed by Haldane. The SABRIs are SCRI 10.08 14.53 69.37 
therefore not eligible to apply for most research council Hannah 3.36 4.48 75.00 
funding. Indeed, for this same reason, major charities such Moredun* 3.91 11.10 35.23 
as the Wellcome also bar them from applying for their Rowett 7.07 10.38 68.10 
funding. Macaulay 7.63 11.91 64.00 
 Total SABRIs 32.05 52.41 61.17 
The position of the SABRIs thus contrasts sharply with most Animal Health 9.34 26.84 34.80 
other research bodies, such as universities, that are of Grassland&Environment 6.50 15.28 42.51 
course able to apply for funding from research councils and Rothamsted 6.36 26.92 23.61 
charities: indeed the research councils are the major John Innes 1.46 21.76 6.71 
funders of research in the biological and agricultural fields Food Research 1.58 13.84 11.43 
in the UK. Roslin 1.86 12.79 14.50 
 Total 27.09 117.42 23.07 
The position of the SABRIs also contrasts with the way in 
which major English departments fund R&D. For example, 
Central Science Lab. 27.70 39.40 70.30 
DEFRA, like SEERAD, has requirements for a spectrum of     
research ranging from policy related research to long-term 
strategic research. Instead of funding one type of body to 
carry out research along this entire spectrum, DEFRA funds 
its Executive Agency, the Central Science Laboratory, (CSL), 
out of English devolved money to concentrate on the 
department’s policy related issues, but funds broader 
research either from Research Council institutes or HEIs. 
Since CSL’s primary function is policy related research, any 
Haldane restriction on it does not hamper it from pursuing 
its basic remit. Any services CSL provides to other public or 
private organisations are on a commercial basis. Since 
DEFRA’s broader research is carried out by bodies which are 
eligible to receive research council funding there are clearly 
opportunities for beneficial synergy, using devolved money 
to work with reserved research council money for the long 
term economic benefit of England. Such synergy 
opportunities are not available to the SABRIs. 
 
In the rest of the UK, those bodies which are most closely 
analogous to the SABRIs tend to be independent charitable 
bodies sponsored out of UK reserved funds by the research 
councils, drawing most of their funding from the 
sponsoring research council but with substantial funding 
coming from a wide variety of other sources including 
government departments. 
 
The effect of these different funding arrangements can be 
seen from the following table which contrasts the funding 
sources of the five SABRIs with the major BBSRC core 
 
Note: SABRIs (exc Moredun) and CSL data: Annual Repor ts 2002-03 




The Scottish Executive spends £32 million on the SABRIs, 
representing 61% of SABRI total income and leveraging 
£20.4 million from other sources. In contrast, the six sister 
institutes shown receive 23% of their funding from the 
relevant English departments, representing £27 million out 
of a total income of £117 million. Note that the English 
departmental money is non-reserved money: that is, it is 
analogous to devolved money in Scotland. The overall effect 
is that, for the BBSRC institutions, relatively small amounts 
of non-reserved money are complemented by very 
significant amounts of reserved funding: while for the 
SABRIs, the bulk of funding comes from devolved, (that is, 
non-reserved) sources. 
 
It is true that, in certain designated targeted research 
projects, a SABRI may apply for BBSRC funding, however 
such funding coming to the SABRIs is small as shown 
below: 




Moredun £35,000  (research grants) 
Rowett  0 
SCRI £230,000  (research grants) 




Overall, the funding arrangements for the SABRIs appears 
highly anomalous: they are bodies which are regarded as 
integral parts of the UK science base but are nevertheless 
barred from accessing important sources of funding. 
 
 
How appropriate are the arrangements for the 
SABRIs? 
As we have, the SABRIs, which constitute an important part 
of the UK science research base, are funded largely out of 
devolved money. In this section we ask the question: how 
appropriate are the arrangements for the SABRIs, and are 
these arrangements  operating efficiently? Before 
embarking on this, we should make several things clear. 
 
First, there is nothing in the arrangements for devolution to 
imply that it is wrong for a devolved department to fund part 
of the UK science base. Indeed, the SABRIs are by no 
means unique in this respect: for example, funding provided 
by SHEFC and the DfEE to HEIs for core research must in 
large part be regarded as contributing to the overall core 
science resource in the UK. It would surely be wrong, and 
an unwarranted restriction on the role of the devolved 
administrations, if in some sense they were limited to 
funding scientific research of parochial significance only. 
 
Secondly, however, there does not appear to be any laid 
down benchmark as to how science policy and funding 
should operate under devolution. The quotation at the head 
of this article taken from the conclusions and 
recommendations of the Quinquennial Review of the 
Council for Science and Technology (CST), illustrates that 
others have come to a similar conclusion. 
 
Thirdly, in considering the funding and organisation 
arrangements for the SABRIs, (and in coming as we shall to 
some critical conclusions), we should nevertheless make it 
clear that we are in no sense criticising the SABRIs 
themselves. It is quite clear that the SABRIs undertake 
some work of the highest international quality. 
 
Since there is no published benchmark to tell us how the 
funding and organisation of bodies like the SABRIs should 
operate under devolution, it is natural to start by asking 
what features the system would be expected to possess in 
an ideal world. We suggest that there are three such 
features: 
 
a) fully integrated planning of respective contributions to 
the UK science base by devolved departments and by 
departments managing reserved functions (that is, UK 
wide functions). 
 
b) in the situation where a devolved department is, 
(through historical accident, or choice, or both), 
responsible for a section of the UK science base, then 
this should not distort the priorities of the 
department’s own science budget. 
c) Where the UK science base is funded both by devolved 
and reserved funds, then these different financing 
streams should interact efficiently. 
 
 
What does the available evidence show as 
regards these three aspects? 
As regards (a), there is strong circumstantial evidence to 
suggest that the role of the SABRIs is not adequately taken 
account of in the overall planning arrangements of the UK 
science strategy as a whole, even though SEERAD is the 
third largest sponsor of research in this area after BBSRC 
and DEFRA. To give some examples, a Cross Cutting Review 
of Science and Research was carried out by the Office of 
Science and Technology, (a reserved UK function) in 2002 
as part of the Spending Review. The review was 
“government wide”, yet among the long list of departments 
taking part there was no mention either of the SABRIs, or of 
SEERAD, (nor indeed, of the Scottish Executive). Nor was 
there any mention of the SABRIs in “Investing in Innovation 
– A Strategy for Science, Engineering and Technology” 
carried out by DTI, HMT, and DfEE in 2000: interestingly it 
did not appear that the Scottish Executive was involved in 
the preparation of the latter strategy. Nor are SEERAD or 
the Scottish Executive members of the Ministerial 
Committee on Science Policy. In fact, the lack of 
representation or mention of the Scottish Executive 
generally leads us to question whether the general 
interests of the Scottish Executive are adequately 
represented in planning UK science, despite the 
statements in the Scottish Executive’s own Strategy for 
Science that “the Scottish Executive was committed to 
working together with the other administrations to ensure 
that the aims and objectives outlined were achieved across 
the UK, and particularly in Scotland.” Additional evidence 
pointing in the same direction is also provided by the 
following recommendation  in the CST Quinquennial review, 
namely that “Work should be undertaken urgently to clarify 
the present relevance of UK-wide science and technology 
policy to the devolved administrations”. 
 
As regards (b), in principle mechanisms  exist to enable the 
Scottish Executive to take an objective overview of its own 
priorities over the whole field of science policy. In particular, 
the Scottish Executive has established the Scottish Science 
Advisory Committee, (SSAC), as an independent body 
intended to take a broad overview of science activities in 
Scotland and act as a promoter of science: and the SSAC 
has at least one member drawn from a SABRI. Moreover, 
SEERAD, (or more accurately, its predecessor SOAEFD), 
carried out a review of its science research strategy in 
1999, which concluded that the research programme of the 
SABRIs should be focused on its main end-users. Despite all 
this, however, questions do arise about how well the 
Executive’s planning arrangements are working. For one 
thing, there is a strong impression on reading the SEERAD 
review that it is not actually as end-use driven as it purports 
to be. For example, the review justified the relevance of the 




programme to end-user communities with reference to the 
following criteria: 
 
• Priorities identified in Foresight exercises; 
 
• Developing needs of end-users identified during the 
consultation exercise; 
 
• Existing coverage of the SOAEFD programme and that 
of other funders; 
 
• Scientific strengths and capabilities of sponsored 
bodies; 
 
• The ability to adapt the programme to new areas. 
 
Of these five criteria, however, the last three are clearly 
supply related rather than end-use driven. Also, the 
following recommendation  in the review is more suggestive 
of a supply driven process looking for end-users than the 
reverse: “Having identified this broader range of end-uses 
for the outputs from the research programme the challenge 
is to ensure that current and potential end-users are aware 
of the work and able to benefit from it.” 
 
The amount of the Scottish Executive’s available funding 
for science which is devoted to the SABRIs also raises 
questions about the process. Scottish Executive funding 
going to the SABRIs, the Scottish Agricultural College and 
the Royal Botanics is some £50 million per annum, 
compared to the total of £177 million which the Executive 
devotes to supporting basic research at Scotland’s Higher 
education institutions. The question that this raises is 
whether this accurately reflects the relative priorities which 
the Scottish Executive would objectively attach to these 
different areas of science. There must be at least a 
suspicion that the amount of the Scottish Executive’s 
resources which is devoted to organisations which were in 
their origins primarily related to agriculture, no longer 
appropriately reflects the importance of agriculture to the 
Scottish economy: and may in part reflect a degree of 
inertia in the system. It is not possible for us as outsiders 
to draw more categorical conclusions than this; but there is 
at least prima facie evidence that there are serious issues 
about the mechanisms for setting scientific priorities 
within the Scottish Executive which need to be looked at. 
 
Finally, as regards (c) we have noted in the preceding 
section how the interpretation of the Haldane principle 
prevents the SABRIs from accessing the major part of 
research council funding, and also funding from major 
charities. This seems to be a clear, and significant, 
inefficiency in the funding arrangements for the SABRIs. 
There is indeed logic to the Haldane principle as it relates 
to applied research carried out for the narrowly defined 
purposes of government. But a major part of the research 
carried out by the SABRIs is not of this nature. It is long 
term and strategic research, intended to be of UK and 
international relevance: it is carried out as part of the UK 
research base: and, at least in principle, it is intended to 
complement, rather than compete with other research 
being carried out elsewhere in the science base, by 
agencies who do have access to research council funding. 
Moreover, the SABRIs are being specifically encouraged by 
SEERAD to seek wider external funding sources. In these 
circumstances, to prevent the SABRIs from applying to the 
major reserved sources of funding of the science base 
seems perverse – and represents an unwarranted handicap 
for the SABRIs which may, in addition, turn to sub-optimal 
sources of funding (for example, European Framework 
funding): this may in turn distort their research 
programmes. 
 
It should be said at this point that this problem has been 
recognised to the extent that SEERAD has agreed an accord 
with the research councils whereby, if a SABRI teams up 
with another institution which is eligible and is applying for 
research council funding, then the SABRI can apply for 
complementary funding from the SEERAD flexible fund:  but 
this still means that the SABRIs funding comes from 
devolved monies, and the SABRIs are still denied access to 
the reserved funding of the science base – so this device 
does not get round the basic problem. 
 
Overall, we conclude that on each of the criteria identified 
above, there are strong grounds to suggest that the present 
system for planning and funding science under devolution 
is not operating well - at least as regards the SABRIs. In the 




The following recommendations  go, in many respects, 
beyond the narrow focus of the SABRIs into wider issues 
regarding the organisation of science and technology under 
devolution. 
 
The first recommendation is that the Scottish Executive 
should be brought fully into the strategic co-ordination of 
the UK science base. Primarily, a senior Scottish Executive 
minister should be brought into the Ministerial Committee 
on Science Policy: and this minister should be shadowed by 
a senior adviser responsible for taking an overview of 
science in Scotland: (this could, for example, be the Chair 
of the SSAC). This proposal does raise constitutional 
issues- and the status of the Ministerial Committee might 
have to be changed to enable it to embrace ministers from 
the devolved administrations. There would also have to be 
some mechanism for dispute resolution because the last 
resort of cabinet decision and Cabinet responsibility would 
no longer be available. 
 
As regards co-ordination of priorities within Scotland, a 
mechanism already exists – the SSAC. There are questions, 
however, about how effective this mechanism is, and 
reading SSAC reports perhaps gives some clue as to why 
this might be the case. On several occasions, problems are 
defined, but solutions are hinted at in such a coded form as 




to make any worthwhile solution unlikely. For example, in 
the SSAC report, (SSAC 2004) they clearly identify the 
problem that: “The Scottish science base is supported 
through a diversity of mechanisms and structures, but 
these are not always well correlated. Departments within 
the Executive operate more or less independently to fund 
individual parts of the science base.” The solution, however, 
is a fudge: “To ensure the sustainability of science in 
Scotland, the SSAC believes that a framework of 
connectivity must be built into the scientific landscape to 
ensure that there are more effective interfaces, as well as a 
shared understanding of the aspirations and objectives of 
these organisations. These linkages are crucial in terms of 
meeting the challenges of prioritisation and gaining best 
value for the investment in science.” 
 
It is likely that this feature reflects a weakness in the way 
that the SSAC is organized. Making sure that all or most 
interested parties are represented on an advisory 
committee does not guarantee that that body will operate 
efficiently: indeed, the effect can be precisely the opposite. 
A desire for consensus may prevent the body from ever 
making tough recommendations. One possibility might be 
to consider a two-tier structure for the SSAC, which would 
involve a wide consultative forum, but with the 
responsibility for making recommendations resting with an 
inner core who are not constrained by the need to be bound 
by consensus among the wider group. 
 
As regards the inefficiency of the current financial 
arrangements, the simplest approach would be for the UK 
government to relax the strict interpretation  of the Haldane 
principle. This could be done by recognising that 
government funded research falls along a spectrum – from 
short term research for specific applications, to long term 
strategic research: and that where government is funding 
an institution to carry out research largely at the latter end 
of the spectrum, there is no conflict, (and in fact 
considerable potential benefit to all concerned) if the 
institution is also able to bid for research council funding. 
If this change in the interpretation of Haldane is made, 
then the government should also make an effort to 
persuade major charities to take a similar view. 
 
Failing this change, then an alternative approach would be 
to alter the constitutional position of the SABRIs 
themselves, so they no longer fall foul of the Haldane rules. 
To give an example, the NHS too is a major funder of 
research for its own purposes: but it tends to commission 
this research either from units in HEIs, or from MRC 
supported units, rather than putting in core funding. So the 
Haldane problem does not arise. This option is, however, 
not without its problems. For example, if the individual 
SABRIs were to be encouraged to merge with appropriate 
universities, this would arguably damage the SABRIs end 
user focus, particularly given the requirements of the 
research assessment exercise discipline. Moreover, it is 
not obvious that absorbing the SABRIs into convenient 
universities, (much as was done with the former Colleges of 
Education or with the Scottish College of Textiles) would 
result in a rational structure of departments and units 
across Scotland. Such a radical option should only really be 
progressed as part and parcel of a wider assessment of the 
requirements for and structure of biological research in the 
HEI sector as a whole. 
 
It is suggested that the above changes would go a long way 
to resolving the problems identified in this paper. 
Nevertheless, even if such changes were implemented, it is 
likely that there would still be a basic problem about 
satisfactorily managing the UK science base in the context 
of devolution. The basic problem stems from the following 
three peculiar features of the task of managing the science 
base: 
 
a) First of all, science is in an anomalous intermediate 
position, neither wholly devolved nor wholly reserved. 
The role of the OST in keeping an overview of science 
policy for the UK as a whole is reserved: and the major 
part of the support for science, through research 
council funding is also reserved. But, as we have seen, 
Scotland, as a devolved administration, has its own 
interest in science policy: and is responsible for 
funding a significant part of the UK science base, 
including core research in Scottish HEIs, from devolved 
money. 
 
b) Secondly, even for those par ts of science which are 
devolved, it makes no sense for a devolved 
administration like Scotland to work in isolation. 
Science thus differs fundamentally from other 
traditional devolved services: for services like health 
and education, it makes sense (indeed it is inherent in 
the very idea of devolution) for each administration to 
organise the service within its area as it sees fit. But 
as regards science, each part of the UK has a vested 
interest in ensuring that the science base for the UK 
works well not just in the interests of each individual 
country but as a coherent whole. This was recognised 
in the report by the Royal Society and the Royal Society 
of Edinburgh, (1999), which stated: “These are 
benefits, which Scotland shares, which flow from the 
large size and competitiveness of the UK basic 
research system. The diseconomies of small scale are 
severe, and barriers between Scotland and the rest of 
the UK would be to the great disadvantage of all. It is 
vital therefore that Scotland remains a well integrated 
part of the UK SET base.” 
 
c) Thirdly, a devolved administration like the Scottish 
Executive is likely to be in an inherently weak position 
in influencing the direction of development of the UK 
science base compared with an “English devolved” 
department such as DfEE. This will arise for a number 
of reasons. Geography and population size will play a 
part. In addition, the natural consultative channels 
between “reserved” bodies such as OST and the 
research councils will tend to be primarily with the 




relevant Whitehall Departments: this can be seen 
clearly in the consultation leading up to the OST’s 
cross cutting review of Science and Technology. Also, 
the Westminster Parliament is at one and the same 
time both the “provincial” parliament as regards 
devolved matters in England, and the decision making 
body for reserved matters for the UK as a whole. So 
when a problem arises on a “devolved” matter in 
England the full weight of both devolved and reserved 
powers is likely to be brought to bear on the issue, in a 
way that is unlikely to happen when a corresponding 
problem arises in one of the devolved administrations. 
 
If, as these features imply, there are continuing problems in 
managing the UK science base satisfactorily in the context 
of devolution, then it may be that in due course radical 
changes have to be considered. One possibility, for 
example, would be to devolve the work and funding of the 
research councils. Such a move would certainly greatly 
increase the bargaining power of a body such as the 
Scottish Executive in national negotiations about the 
science base. The paradox might be that, far from 
threatening the work of the science base, devolving the 
research councils might actually lead to a better 
functioning science base in the interests of the whole of 
the UK. 
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